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Abstract 
The Department of Defense (DoD) acquires operational systems via major defense acquisition 
programs (MDAPs). An average MDAP today will take about 8 years to deliver a new system (or 
new capabilities) to the operating forces using existing acquisition processes.  
Cycle time is the duration between the start of system development until it is available for use. 
Programs can execute as planned when program cycle times are shorter than the pace of 
technology and adversary change. The pace of technology and adversary change is pushing the 
DoD to streamline acquisition processes and deliver products faster.  
This paper presents a subset of research performed. It provides an overview of significant factors 
related to schedule and schedule growth. It classifies program acquisition strategies into three 
groups and identifies cycle time–related factors for these strategy groups. 
Keywords: Acquisition strategies, Major Defense Acquisition Programs, program cycle times, 
decision frameworks, program management, predictor variable selection quantitative data 
analysis 
Introduction 
Former Secretary of Defense Mattis (2018) emphasized the need to deliver new 
capabilities at “the speed of relevance” (p. 10). The Department of Defense (DoD) will fast-track 
certain projects and focus priorities and resources to execute these projects. This research 
speaks to programs in the rest of the portfolio—those developing new capabilities that must 
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accommodate changing priorities and resources and still deliver products on time and as 
promised. 
Programs can execute as planned when program cycle times are shorter than the pace 
of technology and adversary change. However, the pace of technology and adversary change is 
pushing the DoD to deliver some capabilities sooner,1 which often requires leadership 
involvement, greater risk, cost, effort, and acquisition process modifications.2 These accelerated 
programs compete with other acquisition programs for resources and priorities, meaning some 
still-required programs will deliver required systems to the operating forces later and in smaller 
quantities than initially planned, unless they can make changes to reduce their cycle times. 
Research Scope 
This research focused on selected Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs)3 
active between 2007 through 2018 within the context of a defense-unique market with multiple 
government stakeholders and increasing demand for reduced cycle time4 and capability 
delivery. Major policy changes5 enacted between 2007 and 2018 provide context for the 
quantitative analysis of cycle time.6  
Research Questions and Objectives 
The research investigated policy and management issues related to accelerating DoD 
acquisition processes and addressed the following questions: 
1. What data reported in publicly released reports are significant predictors of program 
cycle time and schedule change? In this research, cycle times are in months, and 
program start means approval to commence engineering and manufacturing 
development (also called Milestone B). Schedule change is the relative percent 
change relative to original cycle time since program start. 
2. How do these predictors change with acquisition strategies? Acquisition strategies 
are detailed plans mandated by the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR 7, 2021). 
They are typically not publicly released but are inferred from observables such as 
solicitations, contract awards, budget and reporting documentation, and public 
reports of significant issues and events such as test failures and declaration of Initial 
Operational Capability (IOC).  
The research produced several databases from publicly available sources suitable for 
research. These are available for research upon request from the authors. Simple regression 
 
1 Rapid Acquisition Offices can deliver interim solutions within 2 years of request. 
2 This is called streamlining or tailoring. 
3 MDAPs are weapon system programs with research and development expenditures greater than $300 
million or procurement expenditures greater than $1.80 billion indexed to Fiscal Year 1990 constant 
dollars (MDAP, 2007).  
4 Cycle time is the duration between the start of system development until it is available for use, 
commonly identified by terms such as Initial Operational Capability (IOC) or Required Asset Availability 
(RAA). 
5 Specifically, the Weapons System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, the 2016 National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA), and policy changes prior to January 2020 showcase this increasing demand 
for reduced cycle time. 
6 For example, the 2016 NDAA Section 804 changes require capability delivery within 5 years of program 
start to use these authorities.  
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models of cycle times and cycle time changes identified factors affecting cycle time reduction 
and growth from historical data.  
We examined how these factors change with different acquisition strategies. This paper 
continues with an overview of recent literature, methodology, a summary of results, and 
conclusions.  
Overview 
The DoD executes MDAPs as life-cycle programs, where activities may be binned 
between development (which includes acquisition), procurement, and operations and support 
(O&S) phases of life. The F-14 spent 6 years in development, was produced for 22 years, and 
was operational for 33 years (“F-14 Tomcat,” n.d.), or about 17% of its life in development, 61% 
in production, and 92% in service.7 Platforms such as ships, aircraft, and vehicles are typically 
produced using hardware-based facilities with finite production capacities. For example, the 
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle program has a planned production buy of 58,306 vehicles (Dodaro, 
2019). Full rate production at current budget levels is about 2,500 vehicles per year 
(Department of the Army, 2019), meaning production to meet inventory requirements could 
continue for over 20 years.  
Acquisition Strategies 
The DoD buys products, tangible and intangible items, and services collectively 
described as a capability. Acquisition strategies are developed by program offices and approved 
by senior leadership, and contain a statement of need for the capability, an estimated cost and 
schedule, and the contracting and support plans. Acquisition plans are statutory and regulatory 
documents that explicitly describe the contracting and competition8 approaches (FAR 7.105, 
2021). Specific statutory requirements vary depending upon the contracting strategy and include 
additional detail such as market surveys, performance criteria, and plans and requirements for 
technology development and risk management, test and evaluation, and security (FAR 7, 2021). 
Schoeni (2018) defined three types of government acquisition strategies: coercion, 
public–private partnerships, and Competition using Open System Architectures . He found that 
only competition results in innovation (Schoeni, 2018). 
The DoD categorized9 acquisition strategies as acquisition models (Kendall et al., 2015). 
These include common structures such as hardware and software development, production, 
and operation and significant program phases and milestones. Programs are encouraged to 
tailor these models to the planned MDAP’s “unique character” (Kendall et al., 2015). The GAO 
found variations within these models, such as planning to declare initial operational capability 
before completing initial operational test and evaluation (Dodaro, 2019).  
An acquisition strategy defines production and performance requirements delivery plans 
spanning single-step or incremental schedules. Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) describe 
and document production and performance requirements delivery, including production 
(hardware production line or software replication) and requirements fulfillment (complete or 
 
7 The F-14 program overlapped development and production and had concurrent production and 
operational service.  
8 The Federal Acquisition Regulations emphasize full and open competition and fixed-price contracts 
(FAR 7.105, 2021).  
9 This research was prior to implementation of the Agile Acquisition Framework. 
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incremental). Incremental upgrades10 are production expressions of evolutionary acquisition 
strategies (Sylvester & Ferrara, 2003). By managing production and deployment configurations, 
incremental upgrades can be used to align production lots with deliveries of capabilities that 
mature between production versions (Mortlock, 2019). 
 Mortlock (2019) examined acquisition strategy development based upon assessed 
technical risk, approved requirements, and planned funding—using data from an actual program 
history, leading participants through decisions that a program office would make during program 
strategy development. He found that affordability concerns drive cost and schedule constraints, 
and despite preferences for single step acquisitions, incremental development is one of few 
choices for managing risk (Mortlock, 2019).  
Acquisition strategies may include multiple acquisitions operating with varying degrees 
of coordination and interaction, such as unconstrained or complex systems (Stuckey et al., 
2017). Rendon et al. (2012) identified system-of-system–related acquisition issues, such as 
control and program office staffing, and how these issues translate into modifications to 
contracting and organizational structures.  
Georgiev (2010) analyzed defense acquisition strategy from a national perspective as a 
method to achieve policy goals. He classified defense acquisition strategies into those seeking 
technology innovation (active or offensive) or those adapting strategies to the current 
environment (passive or defensive) and the intended technology position (leader, follower, or 
outsider). He provided a hybrid of strategic and balanced scorecards to improve management 
decisions and results.  
 Existing regulations and statutes11 define DoD rapid acquisition strategies. These limits 
result in limited scope and quantified objectives, senior leadership support and oversight, 
resource prioritization ahead of other programs, and extensive customization of existing 
processes to achieve program objectives. Tate (2016) postulated that only a few acquisition 
strategies are capable of rapid fielding—specifically, using already mature or developed 
systems, incremental development and production of limited or narrow capability improvements, 
and modular upgrades.  
Acquisition strategies are generally not publicly available; however, some elements are 
in publicly available documentation,12 such as single-step or evolutionary acquisition, technical 
maturity choices, and constraints on cost, schedule, and performance.  
Schedule Growth Predictors 
Better Buying Power was a process improvement initiative started by Secretary of 
Defense Robert Gates in 2010 (Layden, 2012) and expanded by the under secretary of defense 
for acquisition, technology, and logistics, Frank Kendall, in 2014 (Kendall, 2014)—with policy 
and direction to “buy more with no more” (Sethi, 2015). The initiative emphasized incentive-type 
contracts, affordability, and cost savings and realism (Kendall, 2014). Three parameters 
important to Better Buying Power are procurement quantities, unit cost, and cycle times; this 
research considers these the functional objectives of an acquisition strategy.  
Cost growth is related to acquisition strategy factors such as prototyping, contract 
incentives in development and production, production competition, schedule concurrency, and 
 
10 Incremental upgrades are also referred to in the literature as block upgrades or release versions. 
11 See https://aida.mitre.org for more information. 
12 These include SARs, annual reports, and budget submissions. 
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schedule slip (Arena et al., 2006). Foreman (2007) identified longitudinal cost and schedule 
predictor variables based on SAR data. He showed that cost growth changes are related to 
procurement quantity changes and depend weakly on schedule growth between production 
decision (Milestone C) and IOC.  
Lorell et al. (2017) compared six MDAPs with extreme cost growth and four with low cost 
growth and identified five salient program characteristics.13 They noted, “Most of the extreme 
cost-growth programs’ problems stemmed from a gross underestimation of the complexities and 
uncertainties … in designing, developing, integrating, and producing very challenging 
technological systems” (p. 97).  While their findings are specific for cost growth, technical 
maturity and integration complexity are also related to schedule growth (Kamp, 2019).  
Holloman et al. (2016) used SAR summary variance data to create cost, time and 
technical system-level degree of difficulty indicators and GAO Annual Assessments of Selected 
Weapon Systems maturity assessment data to indicate achieved technical performance. Using 
these indicators enables program managers to characterize acquisition performance risk during 
execution from monitoring and control processes such as Earned Value Management.14  
Jimenez et al. (2016) conducted a literature review to find historical schedule growth 
predictors and identified statistically significant schedule-related predictors from MDAP SARs. 
Two variables were positively correlated to schedule growth between program start (Milestone 
B) and a production decision (Milestone C): research and development funds at program start, 
and program start on or after 1985. Two additional variables were negatively correlated with 
growth between Milestones B and C: percent research and development funds at program start, 
and program being a modification of an existing program or system (Jimenez et al., 2016).  
Random forest methods have been used to create predictive contracting performance 
models (Gill et al., 2019) and provide an efficient method to identify important variables for use 
in a regression model (Grömping, 2009). Specific implementation issues are in the Methodology 
section of this paper. Wauters and Vanhoucke (2017) applied K-nearest neighbor methods to 
forecast project schedule and control methods and found that K-nearest neighbor methods work 
best for repetitive projects or those with accurate variability estimates. They also found that 
earned value/earned schedule approaches are best for controlling projects with high 
uncertainty.  
This research fills the gap relating schedule prediction to acquisition strategies and will 
test two research hypotheses: 
• Program cycle time may be predicted from programmatic resources and acquisition 
strategy decisions (H1).  
• Percent change in program cycle time may be predicted from programmatic structural 
changes (H2). 
 
13 These are “insufficient technology maturity and higher integration complexity than anticipated;  unclear, 
unstable, or unrealistic requirements, unrealistic cost estimates, adoption of acquisition strategies and 
program structures that lacked adequate processes for managing risk through incrementalism or through 
provision of appropriate oversight and incentives for the prime contractor, (and) use of a combined MS 
B/C milestone (assuming) that little or no RDT&E is required” (Lorell et al., 2017, pp. ix–x). 
14 Earned value tools relate project cost and schedule at the work breakdown structure level For a discussion of 
Earned Value Management, see Wei et al. (2016).  
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Program Functional Objectives 
Program functional objectives—the cost, time to deliver, quantities delivered, and system 
performance—are the planned outcomes or results of the acquisition strategy. Cantwell et al. 
(2012) used a systems dynamics model to examine different cost-reducing strategies; all 
resulted in performance reduction and fewer delivered systems, three of four responses 
reduced total cost, and three of four achieved required schedule. This research used cycle time, 
unit cost, and procurement quantities as explicit program functional objectives. 
Capili (2018) developed a system dynamics model of how factors such as contract 
types, schedule, and requirements and policy issues15 can affect the ability of the government to 
implement Agile software development. Agile contracting scopes the number of requirements or 
story points during a fixed period of performance and cost (level of effort). Adding requirements 
during the Agile process results in trades and reductions of story points delivered to stay within 
schedule and cost constraints. Capili argued that the government acquisition constraints 
eliminate the ability of Agile processes to adapt to program changes.  
Blair et al. (2011) provided examples from National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) systems development and fielding and argued that most problems16 in 
aerospace systems are due to problems with technical integration or system engineering 
deficiencies and failing to understand interactions. However, they also showed that institutional 
mandates, such as minimizing crew risk, bound what may be eliminated and add time and cost 
to acquisition strategies.17  
Wong (2016) argued that the Mine Resistant Ambush-Protected vehicle program was 
delayed due to two institutional factors: validating the urgency of need and the decision to 
acquire systems meeting a long-term need or reacting to an urgent threat. These are analogous 
to Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) deliberations and approvals 
of new capability requirements (McKenzie, 2018). 
Methodology 
This section reviews the research data collected, summarizes the response and 
predictor variables, and explains the supporting quantitative methods used in the research. 
Research Design Overview 
The study used data from publicly available reports on MDAPs from 2007 to 2018, from 
both the GAO annual assessments and Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) 
annual reports. We used Minitab 18, SPSS, and selected R libraries for statistical analyses. All 
data sets are in comma-separated variable formats and available from the authors upon 
request. 
Data Collection 
The data set contains 162 observations in an Excel spreadsheet. Observations had 
reports from both the GAO and the DOT&E during the fiscal year. This reduced the quantity of 
 
15 As an example, information assurance may be at the same time a story point, a policy, and a contract 
requirement. 
16 Blair et al. (2011) assert that 80% of problems are due to integration or system engineering failure 
without substantiation. 
17 They also provided several examples where designs were limited by physics or system engineering 
maturity (Blair et al., 2011, pp. 87–98) and required extensive systems engineering efforts to deliver the 
intended system performance. 
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observations but ensured two independent assessments of program status. SAR data and SAR 
summary data supplemented GAO information.  
The data set was cleaned, filtered, and tested for consistency, correlation, and 
independence (Marshall & Russell, 2018). These were inspected by variable for correct entry 
and tested using Dixon’s r22 outlier test (Minitab, n.d.) for outliers. 
Statistical Methods 
We characterized variables and their distributions by means, medians, standard 
deviations, and skew, kurtosis, and proportions (for categorical variables). We also calculated 
correlation coefficients and significance for continuous and categorical variables. We used 
graphing for qualitative data assessment. 
Ensemble modeling (Ray, 2017) using the R randomForest package (Liaw, 2018) was 
used to identify important predictor variables. We compared variable importance from three R 
random forest packages—randomForest, cforest (Hothorn, 2020), and VSURF (Genuer, 
2019)—to estimate variable importance and regression model performance (Grömping, 2009).  
We created regression models in Minitab and SPSS relating cycle time to predictor 
variables. We adjusted models to maximize the predicted coefficient of determination (R-
sq[pred]) with the fewest number of terms and inspected residual plots to identify any trends and 
verify regression assumptions. We tested association and independence of categorical factors 
to shorter or longer cycle times using chi-square tests. Finally, we used K-means clusters to 
classify acquisition strategies, subsetted the data into groups, and created regression models by 
groups to interpret differences in significant variables. 
Results and Analysis 
Cycle Time and Percent Change Cycle Time Regression Results 
Random forest analysis identified starting predictor subsets for cycle time and percent 
change in cycle time regression models. We created a validation data set with a random draw of 
44 (27%) of the full data set. A manual step-wise regression on the remaining 118 observations 
removed predictors with p values greater than 0.05 one at a time. Variance inflation factors 
(VIFs) were all less than 5, indicating no collinearity issues. The final models satisfied all 
regression assumptions. Table 1 summarizes significant predictors. 
Table 1. Significant Regression Predictors 
Cycle time 
(factor unit change = ∆ months) 
% cycle time change 
(factor unit change = % ∆) 
R&D budget: (+) Procurement budget % ∆ (+) 
Software approach Agile (-),  
Hybrid/NA (-) [relative to Waterfall] 
DoDI 5000.02 Acq model: Model 4 (-), 
Models 2,5,6 (+) [relative to Model 1] 
Joint (-) 
Depends on other MDAPS (+) 
SVC Army, DoD (-), Navy (+) [relative to 
AF] 
Reuses in-service technology (-) 
Uses commercial technology (-) 
Integration issues (-) 
# Critical Technology Elements (CTEs) (+) 
Financial instability (+) Financial instability (+) 
Restructured (+) 
NM Breach (+)  
R-sq(pred)~ 58% R-sq(pred)~ 59% 
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Factors marked as (+) are associated with increasing cycle times. The factors 
highlighted in green and yellow are structural factors. Factors in red are either external or 
caused by external issues. Factors marked as (-) are associated with shorter cycle times. 
Strategy structure factors associated with reducing cycle time include execution as a 
joint program use of an Agile or hybrid (including incremental) software development strategy, 
use of commercial technologies, and reuse of developed military technology. These factors may 
be changeable by program offices during execution.  
We divided the data set cycle times into four quartiles to test categorical factor 
associations to MDAP cycle-time historical performance. We used chi-square association tests 
to test the trained regression model categorical predictors against cycle-time quartiles (Q1 = 1st 
quartile, Q4 = 4th quartile).  
One factor, DoD acquisition model, was retired during this research. Table 2 
summarizes the results of testing the association of the now-retired DoD acquisition model 
types18 to cycle-time quartiles. 
Table 2. DoD Acquisition Plan by Quartile 
 5000,02 model Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 P 
1 21 20 22 26 0.000 
2 0 1 2 6   
4 4 0 0 2   
5 10 16 17 4   
6 8 1 1 1   
  xx  overrepresented in Q   
  xx  underrepresented in Q   
 
 Model 3, Incrementally Deployed Software Intensive Program, is not in this table as the 
data set had no such programs. P is the p value for the likelihood ratio test and shows a 
statistically significant association between cycle-time quartiles (columns) and DoD acquisition 




18 One example of a now-retired DoD acquisition model type is Model 1, “Hardware Intensive Program” 
(Kendall et al., 2015). 
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Table 3. Quartiles Versus Regression Factors: Full Data Set 
Factor Category Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 P 
Software approach Waterfall 17 15 20 26 0.001 
 Agile 21 23 20 7  
  Hybrid/NA 5 0 2 6  
Joint no 32 29 34 34 0.475 
 yes 11 9 8 5  
Depends on other  no 28 12 14 7 0.000 
MDAPs yes 15 26 28 32  
Reuses in-service no 12 19 13 15 0.176 
technology yes 31 19 29 24  
Uses commercial no 21 21 31 35 0.000 
technology yes 22 17 11 4  
Financial  no 27 15 15 6 0.000 
instability yes 16 23 27 33  
 
Two factors, joint and reuses in-service technology, did not show an association 
between the factors and cycle-time quartiles (P greater than 0.05). Programs with Waterfall-type 
software approaches were associated with longer cycle times (Q4). Programs using Agile and 
Hybrid-type19 software approaches were associated with shorter cycle times (Q1). Commercial 
technology use was associated with shorter cycle times (Q1); programs that did not use 
commercial technology had longer cycle times (Q4). Finally, two program factors were 
associated with shorter cycle times (Q1) when they were not present: (a) dependence on other 
MDAPS and (b) financial instability (i.e., budget change greater than 10%).  
Predictor Change with Acquisition Strategies 
We classified the research data set into three acquisition strategies using K-means 
clustering with standardized variables on the functional objectives of cycle time, unit cost, and 
procurement quantities,20 as shown in Table 4. 
Table 4. Acquisition Strategy Clustering Summary 
Mean 
Cycle time 
(mo) Unit cost ($M) 
Procurement 
quantity Count 
High-End 168 2,833 364 56 
Focused 92 175.8 274 64 
Volume 99 1.4 56,044 42 
Each row represents a functional objective, and the mean functional objective value is in 
the respective column. The maximum value of each column is in bold. Two of the three clusters 
 
19 “Hybrid” included incremental and mixtures of Agile, incremental, evolutionary, or some other approach. 
20 Clustering was on cycle time and the natural log transform of unit cost and procurement quantities. 
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align with column maxima—acquiring exquisite (“high-end”) capabilities and high unit cost, and 
acquiring product in large quantities (“volume”). The third cluster represents balancing functional 
objectives (“focused”) to deliver a capability requiring intermediate quantities and costs. The 
count column shows the number of observations in the data set in each cluster. Figure 1 shows 
this strategy grouping.  
 
 
Figure 1. Acquisition Strategy Clusters 
 
This classification strategy is dependent upon the values of the functional objectives and 
would be different if the classification used other objectives or used different approaches—such 
as weighting objectives or changing the clustering method. We tested factor significance using 
the same factors as in Table 1. Table 5 summarizes significant predictors by strategy. 
 
Table 5. Cycle Time Significant Factors by Acquisition Strategy Cluster 
High-End Focused Volume 
R&D Budget (+) R&D Budget (+) R&D Budget (+) 
Software approach*: 
Agile, hybrid (-) 
Software approach*: 
Agile, hybrid (-) 
Software approach*: 
Agile, hybrid (-) 
Joint (-) 
Depend on other MDAPs (+) 
Joint (-) 
Depend on other MDAPs (+) 
Joint (-) 
Depend on other MDAPs (+) 
Reuse existing DoD tech (-) 
Use commercial tech (-) 
Reuse existing DoD tech (-) 
Use commercial tech (-) 
Reuse existing DoD tech (-) 
Use commercial tech (-) 
Financial instability (+) Financial instability (+) Financial instability (+) 
R-sq(pred): 27% 
No Box-Cox transform 
No outliers removed 
R-sq(pred): 46% 
Box-Cox rounded λ = 0.5 
One outlier removed22 
R-sq(pred): 82% 
Box-Cox rounded λ = 0.5 
Two outliers removed21 
* Relative to Waterfall 
  
 
21 The outliers were removed to meet regression residual linearity assumptions. 
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 Crossed-out and red factors (example) were not significant. Two groups had fewer 
significant predictors and a similar or better R-sq(predicted). The High-End group needed 
additional factors to improve model performance.22 Table 6 shows percent cycle-time change 
for these same groups with the same coding as before. 
Table 6. Percent Change in Cycle Time for Strategy Groups 
High-End Focused Volume 
Procurement Budget Change (+) Procurement Budget Change (+) Procurement Budget Change (+) 
DoD 5000.02 (old) model **:  
2,5,6 (+), 4 (-)  
DoD 5000.02 (old) model **:  
2,5,6 (+), 4 (-)  
DoD 5000.02 (old) model **:  
2,5,6 (+), 4 (-)  
Service (relative to AF):  
Navy (+), Army, DoD (-) 
Service (relative to AF):  
Navy (+), Army, DoD (-) 
Service (relative to AF):  
Navy (-), Army, DoD (-) 
Integration issues (-) 
# Critical Tech Elements (+) 
Integration issues (-) 
# Critical Tech Elements (+) 
Integration issues (-) 
# Critical Tech Elements (+) 
Financial instability (+) 
Restructure (+),  
NM breach (+) 
Financial instability (+) 
Restructure (+),  
NM breach (+) 
Financial instability (+) 
Restructure (+),  
NM breach (+) 
R-sq(pred): 61% 
Two outliers removed 
R-sq(pred): 55% R-sq(pred): 48% 
 
 Use of commercial technology, dependence on other programs, the number of critical 
technologies, and research budgets tended to differentiate between High-End, Focused, and 
Volume strategies. Volume strategy cycle time and change in cycle time were not related to 
research budgets and procurement budget changes but did reflect software development 
process differences. High-End strategies were not sensitive to the number of critical technology 
elements. Focused strategies were sensitive to financial instabilities. 
Conclusions and Future Work. 
Conclusions 
Initial structural and strategy decisions affect cycle-time outcomes. Program cycle times 
are related to program resources and acquisition strategy decisions, and percent change in 
program cycle time is related to program structural changes. Significant cycle-time predictors 
include the size of research and development budgets, deciding to use commercial or reuse 
existing in-service technology, and avoiding dependency on other programs. Schedule change 
 
22 In this case, unit cost (+) and change in unit cost (+) were significant predictors for High-End programs. 
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(as measured by percent change in cycle time) was related to changing procurement budgets, 
the number of critical technology elements in a program, and financial (budgetary) stability.  
Classifying MDAP acquisition strategies based on functional objectives of cycle time, 
unit cost, and procurement quantities highlighted how different factors, such as use of 
commercial technology or reuse of existing technology, were associated with reduced cycle 
times and early program decisions. We showed how significant cycle time and schedule growth 
predictors changed with acquisition strategies. 
Relevance and Contribution to the Practice 
 This research provided quantitative insight into acquisition strategy factors affecting 
program cycle times and cycle-time growth. The associations between objectives and structural 
factors affect cycle times and identified significant acquisition strategy choices made during 
program development related to cycle-time outcomes. 
Recommendations 
 These results reflect the use of public data and may not apply to non-MDAP programs. 
Future research should re-perform this research on a larger government-controlled data set and 
internal program documentation and compare findings with open-source results. 
This material is based upon work supported by the Acquisition Research Program under 
Grant No. HQ00341910004. The views expressed in written materials or publications, and/or 
made by speakers, moderators, and presenters, do not necessarily reflect the official policies of 
the Department of Defense nor does mention of trade names, commercial practices, or 
organizations imply endorsement by the U.S. government. 
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